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The Limits of Liberty: The Crime of 
Male Same-Sex Conduct and the 
Rights to Life and Personal Liberty 
in Singapore
Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26
❒
Jack Tsen-Ta Lee*
In Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General (2014), the Singapore Court 
of Appeal held that s 377A of the Penal Code, which criminalises acts of 
“gross indecency” between men whether occurring in public or private, does 
not infringe either the rights to equality and equal protection guaranteed by 
Art 12(1), or the rights to life and personal liberty guaranteed by Art 9(1) of 
the Constitution. This article examines the analyses of the latter provision by 
the Court of Appeal in Lim Meng Suang, and by the High Court in Tan Eng 
Hong v Attorney-General (2013) which was one of the two cases brought 
before the Court of Appeal. It is submitted the courts interpreted Art 9(1) 
narrowly due to the belief that it is not their role to subject government policies 
to rigorous constitutional scrutiny for compliance with fundamental liberties, 
particularly where such policies are seen as dealing with socially controversial 
issues. However, the time is ripe for the Court to discover afresh its role as a 
coequal branch of the government.
1. Introduction
The Singapore Court of Appeal’s judgment in Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-
General1 h eld that s 377A of the Penal Code,2 which criminalises acts of 
“gross indecency” between men whether occurring in public or private, is 
constitutional. This came as no great surprise to public lawyers. It is in line 
with a number of other decisions demonstrating the general diffidence of 
the courts towards constitutional adjudication of government policy.
*  LLB (Hons) (National University of Singapore); LLM (University College London, University 
of London); PhD (University of Birmingham); Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore), Solicitor 
(England and Wales); Assistant Professor of Law, School of Law, Singapore Management 
University. I would like to thank Gillian Seetoh for her research assistance.
1 [2015] 1 SLR 26 (CA).
2 Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed.
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The saga began with the arrest of two men for engaging in oral sex in a 
public toilet cubicle of a shopping centre in March 2010. They were both 
charged with having contravened s 377A, which reads:
“Outrages on decency
Any male person who, in public or private, commits, or abets the 
commission of, or procures or attempts to procure the commission by any 
male person of, any act of gross indecency with another male person, shall 
be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 2 years.”
This prompted one of the men, Tan Eng Hong, to launch a challenge 
against the section for, among other things, infringing Arts 9(1) and 
12(1) of the Constitution.3 Article 12(1) states that “[a]ll persons are 
equal before the law and entitled to the equal protection of the law”, 
while Art 9(1) guarantees the rights to life and personal liberty. As this 
article focuses on the latter provision, we will examine its actual wording 
in due course. Tan’s application was initially struck out by the High Court 
for lack of standing,4 but in August 2012 this decision was overturned on 
appeal.5 This pav ed the way for a hearing of the substantive issues by the 
High Court the following year.
In the meantime, in the wake of Tan’s success before the Court of 
Appeal, a gay couple, Lim Meng Suang and Kenneth Chee Mun-Leon, 
commenced a separate constitutional challenge to s 377A. This case, 
which was heard in February 2013 before Tan’s substantive hearing, was 
argued on the basis that s 377A was inconsistent with Art 12(1) of the 
Constitution. On 9 April 2013, Justice Quentin Loh issued a judgment 
rejecting that contention.6 The same j udge dealt with Tan’s application in 
March, and also dismissed it in a judgment dated 2 October 2013 entitled 
Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General.7 Lim, Chee a nd Tan subsequently 
brought their respective cases to a joint hearing before the Court of 
Appeal, which upheld the constitutionality of s 377A in its judgment of 
28 October 2014.8
As I have previously considered the courts’ treatment of Art 12(1),9 
in this arti cle I turn to an examination of how Art 9(1) was analysed 
by the High Court in Tan Eng Hong and by the Court of Appeal in 
3 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Rep).
4 Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General [2011] 3 SLR 320 (HC).
5 Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General [2012] 4 SLR 476 (CA).
6 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2013] 3 SLR 118 (HC).
7 Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General [2013] 4 SLR 1059 (HC).
8 Lim Meng Suang (CA) (n 1 above).
9 Jack Tsen-Ta Lee, “Equality and Singapore’s First Constitutional Challenges to the Criminalization 
of Male Homosexual Conduct” (2015) 16 Asia-Pacific J on Hum Rts and the L 150.
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Lim Meng Suang. Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor (2015),10 a more recen t 
Court of Appeal judgment on the constitutionality of the penal sentence 
of caning, sheds further light on this issue. It is my thesis that the courts 
have interpreted Art 9(1) narrowly due to the belief that it is not their 
role to subject government policies to rigorous constitutional scrutiny for 
compliance with fundamental liberties, particularly where such policies 
are seen as dealing with socially controversial issues. I submit that this 
conception of the courts’ constitutional responsibility may require 
re-examination.
2. Article 9(1) of the Constitution
Article 9 of the Constitution protects the rights to life and personal 
liberty in the following terms:
“9.— (1)  No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty save 
in accordance with law.
 (2)  Where a complaint is made to the High Court or any Judge 
thereof that a person is being unlawfully detained, the Court 
shall inquire into the complaint and, unless satisfied that the 
detention is lawful, shall order him to be produced before the 
Court and release him.
 (3)  Where a person is arrested, he shall be informed as soon 
as may be of the grounds of his arrest and shall be allowed 
to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of his 
choice.
 (4)  Where a person is arrested and not released, he shall, without 
unreasonable delay, and in any case within 48 hours (excluding 
the time of any necessary journey), be produced before a 
Magistrate, in person or by way of video-conferencing link (or 
other similar technology) in accordance with law, and shall 
not be further detained in custody without the Magistrate’s 
authority.
 (5)  Clauses (3) and (4) shall not apply to an enemy alien or to 
any person arrested for contempt of Parliament pursuant to a 
warrant issued under the hand of the Speaker.
 (6) Nothing in this Article shall invalidate any law —
  (a)  in force before the commencement of this Constitution 
which authorises the arrest and detention of any 
person in the interests of public safety, peace and good 
order; or
10 [2015] 2 SLR 1129 (CA).
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  (b)  relating to the misuse of drugs or intoxicating substances 
which authorises the arrest and detention of any person 
for the purpose of treatment and rehabilitation,
  by reason of such law being inconsistent with clauses (3) and (4), 
and, in particular, nothing in this Article shall affect the validity or 
operation of any such law before 10th March 1978.”
We will focus on Art 9(1) as this was the provision relied on by the 
applicants in the Tan Eng Hong and Lim Meng Suang cases, but will have 
occasion to examine whether Arts 9(2) to 9(4) ought to influence the 
interpretation of Art 9(1).
A plain reading of Art 9(1) suggests that a person seeking to rely on it must 
establish two things. Firstly, the impugned executive action or legislation 
must deprive the person of either “life” or “personal liberty”. As neither of 
the terms is defined by the Constitution, some judicial explication of their 
meanings is required. Secondly, the person must show that the deprivation 
of life or personal liberty has not been achieved “in accordance with law”. 
This raises the issue of what “law” means in this context.
(a) The Meaning of Life and Personal Liberty
The meaning and scope of the terms “life” and “personal liberty” were not 
dealt with by the High Court in either the Lim Meng Suang or Tan Eng 
Hong cases. Instead, the matter was substantively considered for the first 
time by the Court of Appeal when counsel for Lim Meng Suang and 
Kenneth Chee raised a fresh argument: that s 377A infringes Art 9(1) 
because the phrase “life or personal liberty” in the latter, read purposively, 
protects a “limited right of privacy”, that is, “a right of personal autonomy 
allowing a person to enjoy and express affection and love towards another 
human being”.11
The Court of Appeal disagreed on three grounds. I begin by examining 
the first and third ground, and then return to the second ground. The 
first was that “established Singapore jurisprudence” holds that “personal 
liberty” refers only to the “the personal liberty of a person from unlawful 
incarceration or detention”. As such, although the Singapore courts 
had not yet authoritatively interpreted the word “life”, “it should be 
interpreted narrowly in accordance with the jurisprudence on ‘personal 
liberty’ and Art 9’s context and structure”.12 The Court referred to its own 
11 Lim Meng Suang (CA) (n 1 above), 39 [30].
12 Ibid., 43 [45].
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prior decision in Tan Eng Hong on standing,13 in which it had rejected 
counsel’s argument that Art 9(1) “must extend to all those faculties by 
which life is enjoyed”, including “privacy, human dignity, individual 
autonomy and the human need for an intimate personal sphere”.14 In that 
case it had cited a statement in the High Court judgment Lo Pui Sang v 
Mamata Kapildev Dave15 that “the phrase ‘personal liberty’ … has always 
been  understood to refer only to the personal liberty of the person against 
unlawful incarceration or detention”.16
Lo Pui Sang is a puzzling case. Contrary to what the High Court 
suggested, it was in fact the first case in Singapore that had expressed a 
view on the meaning of “personal liberty” in Art 9(1). No authority was 
cited for adopting a narrow interpretation of the term. While mentioning 
that counsel had relied on decisions of the United States Supreme Court,17 
the Court discussed none of them. This suggests the Court did not find 
these decisions applicable, but no clear explanation why was forthcoming. 
US cases have interpreted the term “liberty” in the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the US Constitution18 broadly. For instance, in Meyer v 
Nebraska19 the Supreme Court said that the word “liberty”:20
“ ... denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of 
the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of 
life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up 
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, 
and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as 
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men”.
Closer to home, in Sugumar Balakrishnan v Pengarah Imigresen Negeri 
Sabah,21 the Malaysian Court of Appeal gave Art 5(1) of the Federal 
13 Tan Eng Hong (CA) (n 5 above).
14 Ibid., 524–525 [14].
15 [2008] 4 SLR(R) 754 (HC) (Art 9(1) does not protect a personal liberty to contract). The case 
was reversed on appeal in Ng Eng Ghee v Mamata Kapildev Dave [2009] 3 SLR(R) 109 (CA) but, 
as was noted in Tan Eng Hong (CA), ibid., the Court of Appeal did not refer to the Art 9(1) 
point.
16 Lo Pui Sang (n 15 above), 760 [6].
17 Ibid.
18 The relevant parts of the Fifth Amendment state: “No person shall … be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law …”, while the Fourteenth Amendment, s 1, states: “No 
State shall … deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law …”.
19 262 US 390 (1923).
20 Meyer (n 19 above), 399. See also Munn v Illinois 94 US 113, 142 (1877) (“By the term ‘liberty,’ 
as used in the provision [the Fourteenth Amendment], something more is meant than mere 
freedom from physical restraint or the bounds of a prison. It means freedom to go where one 
may choose, and to act in such manner, not inconsistent with the equal rights of others, as his 
judgment may dictate for the promotion of his happiness—that is, to pursue such callings and 
avocations as may be most suitable to develop his capacities and give to them their highest 
enjoyment.”); Allgeyer v Louisiana 165 US 578, 589 (1897).
21 [1998] 3 MLJ 289 (CA, Malaysia).
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Constitution of Malaysia—which is identical to Art 9(1) of the Singapore 
Constitution22—a broad construction, holding that it includes the liberty 
of a person to apply to court for judicial review.23 While Malaysia’s 
highest court, the Federal Court, disagreed with the Court of Appeal on 
this issue,24 in the later case of Lee Kwan Woh v Public Prosecutor25 the 
Federal Court also interpreted “personal liberty” generously, exp ressing 
the opinion that the concept “includes other rights” such as the right 
to “cross the frontiers in order to enter or leave the country when one 
so desires”.26
In a similar vein, the US Supreme Court in Munn v Illinois27 commented 
thus on the meaning of “life” in the Fourteenth Amendment:28
“By the term ‘life’, as here used, something more is meant than mere animal 
existence. The inhibition against its deprivation extends to all those limbs 
and faculties by which life is enjoyed. The provision equally prohibits the 
mutilation of the body by the amputation of an arm or leg, or the putting 
out of an eye, or the destruction of any other organ of the body through 
which the soul communicates with the outer world. The deprivation not 
only of life, but of whatever God has given to everyone with life for its growth 
and enjoyment, is prohibited by the provision in question if its efficacy be 
not frittered away by judicial decision.”
Munn was cited with approval by the Malaysian Court of Appeal in Tan 
Tek Seng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan.29 The Court concluded 
that the word “life” in Art 5(1) of the Constitution of Malaysia “does 
not refer to mere existence” but “incorporates all those facets that are an 
integral part of life itself and those matters which go to form the quality 
of life”, including “the right to seek and be engaged in lawful and gainful 
employment and to receive those benefits that our society has to offer 
to its members”, “the right to live in a reasonably healthy and pollution 
free environment”, and “the right to continue in public service subject to 
removal for good cause by resort to a fair procedure”.30 The Federal Court 
adopted this broad interpretation of “life” in Lee Kwan Woh.31
22 Article 9(1) of the Singapore Constitution was adopted from Art 5(1) of the Malaysian 
Constitution when Singapore became an independent republic: see the Republic of Singapore 
Independence Act 1965 (No 9 of 1965, 1985 Rev Ed), s 6(1).
23 Sugumar Balakrishnan (n 21 above), 308.
24 See Pihak Berkuasa Negeri Sabah v Sugumar Balakrishnan [2002] 3 MLJ 72 (FC, Malaysia).
25 [2009] 5 MLJ 301 (FC, Malaysia).
26 Ibid., 314 [14], citing Government of Malaysia v Loh Wai Kong [1978] 2 MLJ 175, 178 (HC, 
Malaysia).
27 Munn (n 19 above).
28 Ibid., 142 (emphasis added).
29 [1996] 1 MLJ 261, 287 (CA, Malaysia).
30 Ibid., 288.
31 Lee Kwan Woh (n 25 above), 314 [14].
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At this point, it is appropriate to consider the third reason cited by the 
Singapore Court of Appeal for reading “personal liberty” narrowly. The 
Court traced Art 9(1) genealogically, through Art 5(1) of the Malaysian 
Constitution, back to Art 21 of the Constitution of India which is similar 
but not identical to the former provision. It states: “No person shall be 
deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure 
established by law.” The Court inferred that the Indian Constitution’s 
framers had “consciously rejected the wider US formulation ‘without 
due process of law’ in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
US Constitution”.32 Since provisions similar to Arts 9(3) and 9(4) of 
the Singapore Constitution, which give arrested persons the rights to 
be informed of the grounds of arrest, to be represented by legal counsel, 
and to be produced before a magistrate within 48 hours of arrest, had 
been included in Art 22 of the Indian Constitution, in its opinion Art 21 
therefore focuses on unlawful detention. The Court saw no indication 
that the framers “intended to impute an expansive meaning into the 
phrase ‘life or personal liberty’”.33
However, we cannot overlook the fact that the Supreme Court of 
India does not treat the scope of “life or pe rsonal liberty” as limited in 
the manner just described. For instance, in Samatha v State of Andhra 
Pradesh34 it regarded the right to life as embracing a “right to live with 
human dignity”, which includes “all those rights and aspects of life which 
would go to make a man’s life complete and worth living”.35 In Kharak 
Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh,36 the Court felt unable to hold that the term 
32 Lim Meng Suang (CA) (n 1 above), 44 [47]. Members of the Constituent Assembly of India 
were aware that the Constitution’s Drafting Committee had chosen the phrase “according to 
procedure established by law” in Art 21 (then draft Art 15) to avoid the courts having to assess 
whether statutes were substantively fair, just and reasonable. A number of them supported an 
amendment to substitute the phrase “without due process of law”: “Article 15”, Constituent 
Assembly Debates, Official Report (6 December 1948) (New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, 2003), 
vol VII, pp 850–857. It would appear that the objections melted away after the Chairman of 
the Drafting Committee, Dr BR Ambedkar, explained to the Assembly that it was “a case 
where a man has to sail between Charybdis and Scylla”, a difficult choice between guarding 
against a legislature “making laws which may abrogate or violate what we regard as certain 
fundamental principles affecting the life and liberty of an individual”, and trusting judges to 
determine the constitutionality of laws “by dint of their own individual conscience or their bias 
or their prejudices”: BR Ambedkar, “Article 15”, Constituent Assembly Debates, Official Report 
(13 December 1948), ibid., pp 1000–1001.
33 Lim Meng Suang (CA) (n 1 above), 44 [47].
34 AIR 1997 SC 3297; (1997) Supp 2 SCR 305 (SC, India).
35 Ibid.; (1997) Supp 2 SCR 305, 396.
36 AIR 1963 SC 1295; (1964) 1 SCR 332 (SC, India). See also Satwant Singh Sawhney v 
D Ramarathnam, Assistant Passport Officer AIR 1967 SC 1836; (1967) 2 SCR 525 (SC, India); 
Maneka Gandhi v Union of India AIR 1978 SC 597; (1978) 2 SCR 621 (SC, India) (in both 
cases, the Court held that the right to personal liberty includes the right to travel abroad); 
R Rajagopal v State of Tamil Nadu AIR 1995 SC 264; (1994) 6 SCC 632 (SC, India) (the right to 
personal liberty includes the right to privacy, which extends to oneself and one’s family, and to 
matters such as marriage, procreation, motherhood, childbearing and education, among others).
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“personal liberty” was intended to mean nothing more than “freedom from 
arrest and detention, from false imprisonment or wrongful confinement”. 
Rather, it considered “personal liberty” as:37
“… a compendious term to include within itself all the varieties of rights 
which go to make up the ‘personal liberties’ of man other than those dealt 
with in the several clauses of Art. 19(1). In other words, while Art. 19(1) 
deals with particular species or attributes of that freedom, ‘personal liberty’ 
in Art. 21 takes in and comprises the residue.”
Put another way, since Art 19 of the Indian Constitution confers on citizens 
specific rights to free speech, assembly, association and movement; the 
right to reside in any part of India; and the right to practise any profession 
or carry on any occupation, trade or business, “personal liberty” in Art 21 
refers to all other forms of personal liberty.
The Singapore Court of Appeal downplayed the expansive approach 
taken by the Supreme Court of India, saying that “[t]his approach must be 
understood in the context of India’s social and economic conditions”.38 
With respect, the Court of Appeal’s rather cursory attempt to distinguish 
a rich vein of Indian jurisprudence weakens the argument that Art 21 is 
correctly understood as only addressing unlawful detention, and that its 
descendant, Art 9(1) of the Singapore Constitution, must therefore be 
given that interpretation.
The Court’s second reason for its restrictive interpretation of Art 9(1) 
has been partly alluded to in the discussion of its third reason: that since 
Arts 9(2) to 9(4)39 guarantee certain procedural safeguards in relation to 
arrest and detention, while Arts 9(5) and 9(6) set out exceptions to these 
safeguards, these provisions condition the scope of Art 9(1) which thus 
“refers only to a person’s freedom from an unlawful deprivation of life and 
unlawful detention or incarceration”.40
This reading of Art 9(1), though, tends to disregard the rule that a 
constitution on the Westminster model should not be interpreted like an 
Act of Parliament but as “sui generis, calling for principles of interpretation 
37 Kharak Singh (n 36 above) (1964) 1 SCR 332, 347.
38 Lim Meng Suang (CA) (n 1 above), 44 [48].
39 Article 9(2) of the Constitution states: 
“Where a complaint is made to the High Court or any Judge thereof that a person is being 
unlawfully detained, the Court shall inquire into the complaint and, unless satisfied that 
the detention is lawful, shall order him to be produced before the Court and release him.” 
 Articles 9(3) and 9(4) were described in the text accompanying note 33 above.
40 Lim Meng Suang (CA) (n 1 above), 43–44 [46].
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of its own, suitable to its character”,41 and that the fundamental liberties in 
the Singapore Constitution should be given a “generous interpretation” so 
as to give individuals the  full measure of the liberties referred to.42 Another, 
arguably preferable, reading is that Art 9(1) lays down a general principle 
which is specifically applied to arrested persons by the other clauses of 
Art 9, which are not intended to circumscribe the scope of clause (1). 
A comparison between Arts 9 and 12 can be drawn. Article 12(1) states 
that “[a]ll persons are equal before the law and entitled to the equal 
protection of the law”, while Art 12(2) prohibits discrimination against 
Singapore citizens on the ground only of religion, race, descent or place of 
birth in certain enumerated situations.43 Nonetheless, it was not suggested 
in Lim Meng Suang that Art 12(2) should determine Art 12(1)’s scope 
such that the latter applies only to citizens, or that it only invalidates 
executive or legislative acts which discriminate upon one of the four 
proscribed grounds indicated in Art 12(2).44
Constitutional provisions should generally be accorded a presumption 
in favour of generous interpretation. As Justice Richard O’Connor put it 
in Jumbunna Coal Mine NL v Victorian Coal Miners’ Association,45 “where 
the question is whether the Constitution has used an expression in the 
wider or in the narrower sense, the Court should … always lean to the 
broader interpretation unless there is something in the context or in 
the rest of the Constitution to indicate that the narrower interpretation 
will best carry out its object and purpose”. This is because constitutional 
provisions are frequently expressed in broad and general terms as they are 
“intended to apply to the varying conditions which the development of 
our community must involve”.46
As the courts cannot accurately predict what issues are likely to be 
brought before them for resolution in the future, as a matter of prudence 
41 Ong Ah Chuan v Public Prosecutor [1979–1980] SLR(R) 710, 721 [23]; [1981] AC 648, 670 
(PC on appeal from Singapore), citing Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher [1980] AC 319, 329 
(PC on appeal from Bermuda).
42 Ong Ah Chuan (n 41 above).
43 Article 12(2) of the Constitution states: 
“Except as expressly authorised by this Constitution, there shall be no discrimination 
against citizens of Singapore on the ground only of religion, race, descent or place of birth 
in any law or in the appointment to any office or employment under a public authority 
or in the administration of any law relating to the acquisition, holding or disposition of 
property or the establishing or carrying on of any trade, business, profession, vocation or 
employment.”
44 See also Jack Lee Tsen-Ta, “Rediscovering the Constitution” (1995) 16 Sing L Rev 157, 190–192.
45 (1908) 6 CLR 309 (HC, Australia).
46 Ibid., 367–368. Although the judge was speaking about the construction of words in the 
Australian Constitution which confer a power on the Commonwealth Parliament, it is 
submitted that the comments apply to other types of constitutional provisions as well, including 
those protecting fundamental liberties.
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they ought not to interpret constitutional provisions in unduly narrow 
ways, for this may fetter their discretion. This is arguably what happened in 
Yong Vui Kong (2015),47 decided some four months after Lim Meng Suang. 
The case involved a constitutional challenge against caning as a 
punishment for certain criminal offences in Singapore, including the 
drug trafficking offence which the appellant had been convicted of. He 
submitted, among other things, that the caning punishment violated 
Art 9(1) of the Constitution in two ways: it constituted torture; and 
since he would have to be physically restrained while the punishment 
was imposed, this was a deprivation of his right to personal liberty.48 In 
response, the Public Prosecutor denied that caning amounted to torture, 
and also argued that deprivation of personal liberty in Art 9(1) refers only 
to unlawful incarceration or detention, in line with the Court of Appeal’s 
pronouncements in Lim Meng Suang.49
The case thus required the Court to reconsider the meaning of “life 
or personal liberty”. The Court delved into history again, tracing 
Art  9(1) via Art 5(1) of the Malaysian Constitution to Art  21 of 
the Indian Constitution, and this time further back to the due 
process clauses in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the US 
Constitution, which were themselves rooted in Clause 39 of the 1215 
version of Magna Carta:50
“No free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of his rights or 
possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his standing in any way, 
nor will we proceed with force against him, or send others to do so, except 
by the lawful judgment of his equals or by the law of the land.”
This was quite apt, of course, as 2015 marked the 800th anniversary of 
Magna Carta’s sealing by King John at Runnymede. The Court said that 
47 Yong Vui Kong (CA) (n 10 above).
48 Ibid., 1136 [6(a)] and 1138 [13].
49 Ibid., 1138 [13]. The Public Prosecutor also submitted the physical restraint that caning required 
was not the primary object of the punishment but incidental to its administration, and so should 
not be regarded as a deprivation of personal liberty under Art 9(1).
50 The Court cited an English translation of Clause 39 of the 1215 Magna Carta on the British 
Library’s website, available at http://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-carta-english-
translation (visited 10 February 2015; archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20150906192804/
http://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-carta-english-translation); Yong Vui Kong (CA) 
(n 10 above), 1139 [16]. In Magna Carta 1297 (25 Edw I, c 9), the version of Magna Carta that 
was entered into the statute book, the corresponding provision is Clause 29, which reads: 
“No Freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or be disseised of his Freehold, or Liberties, 
or free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will We not 
pass upon him, nor condemn him [a variant reading from the Statutes of the Realm is ‘deal 
with him’], but by lawful judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land. We will sell to 
no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either Justice or Right.”
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Clause 39 extended beyond unlawful incarceration to the unlawful seizure 
of property and unlawful use of force. It noted that William Blackstone, 
in his Commentaries, had regarded the “rights” of the English people as 
including a “right of personal security” which meant “a person’s legal and 
uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and 
his reputation”.51 In particular:52
“Besides those limbs and members that may be necessary to man, in order 
to defend himself or annoy his enemy, the rest of his person or body is also 
entitled by the same natural right to security from the corporal insults of menaces, 
assaults, beating, and wounding; though such insults amount not to destruction 
of life or member.”
Finding that this understanding of life and liberty had not been altered 
when the essence of Clause 39 was distilled into the constitutions of the 
US, India, Malaysia and Singapore, the Court reinterpreted Art 9(1) of 
the Singapore Constitution as not merely protecting against arbitrary 
execution or incarceration, but also prohibiting “the unlawful use of 
force against a person, including by way of amputations, mutilations, 
assaults, beatings, woundings, etc”, which, according to Blackstone, was 
a deprivation of “life”. Thus, the caning sentence proposed to be carried 
out on the appellant would potentially infringe Art 9(1) unless it was “in 
accordance with law”. However, the ambit of Art 9 does not extend to the 
rights protected by other provisions of the Constitution, such as Art 10 
which prohibits slavery and forced labour, and Art 13 which guarantees 
citizens the rights not to be banished from Singapore and to have freedom 
of movement and residence within Singapore without unnecessary 
curtailment; or to potential rights, such as the right to property, that were 
considered by Parliament and excluded.53
If the Court of Appeal had not defined “life” and “personal liberty” 
so restrictively in Lim Meng Suang, it would have been unnecessary for 
those terms to be reinterpreted more broadly in Yong Vui Kong (2015). 
It is submitted the Court acted correctly in doing so, though it remains 
to be seen whether the Court will be inclined to extend the meaning 
of the terms beyond freedom from unlawful detention and bodily harm. 
Clause 39 of Magna Carta, relied upon approvingly by the Court, has 
been understood by some commentators to protect a wide range of 
rights and liberties. Although William Sharp McKechnie suggested 
51 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England. Book the First. (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1765) p 125, cited in Yong Vui Kong (CA) (n 10 above), 1140 [18].
52 Ibid., p 130, cited in Yong Vui Kong (CA) (n 10 above), 1140, [18] (original emphasis).
53 Yong Vui Kong (CA) (n 10 above), 1142 [22]–[23].
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that the “liberties” referred to originally covered “feudal jurisdictions, 
immunities, and privileges of various sorts”,54 Edward Coke in his 
Institutes of the Laws of England saw the term as extending beyond 
franchises and privileges granted by the king to his subjects. He gave 
the following example:55
“[T]he company of the merchant tailors of England, having power by their 
charter to make ordinances, made an ordinance, that every brother of the 
same society should put the one half of his clothes to be dressed by some 
clothworker free of the same company, upon pain to forfeit x. s. &c. and 
it was adjudged that this ordinance was against law, because it was against 
the liberty of the subject, for every subject hath freedome to put his clothes to be 
dressed by whom he will …”
Richard Thomson interpreted “liberties” as including “the natural 
freedom possessed by the subjects of England”,56 and, as was noted in Yong 
Vui Kong (2015), Blackstone himself saw the rights possessed by a free 
man as including “uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, 
his health, and his reputation”, and a right of free movement.57
In Lim Meng Suang, the Court of Appeal concluded its analysis of 
the meaning of “life or personal liberty” in Art 9(1) by commenting 
that Lim and Chee’s counsel had conceded that “the private law relating 
to privacy was a developing one”. Thus, it was clear that the appellants 
“cannot obtain by the (constitutional) backdoor what they cannot 
obtain by the (private law) front door”, and that “such a right ought… 
to be developed by way of the private law on privacy instead”.58 It is not 
immediately obvious why the development of constitutional law should 
necessarily be constrained by private law. The courts have independent 
duties to interpret the Constitution and to develop the common law, 
and there is no imperative connection between the two tasks. The 
meaning of Art 9(1) does not change just because the courts recognise 
a tort of privacy—it is trite that since the Constitution is the supreme 
law of Singapore,59 it cannot be altered either by ordinary statutes or by 
54 William Sharp McKechnie, Magna Carta: A Commentary on the Great Charter of King John: With 
an Historical Introduction (Glasgow: James Maclehose and Sons, 2nd ed., 1914) 384.
55 Edward Coke, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Lawes of England: Containing the Exposition 
of Many Ancient, and Other Statutes (London: Printed by M[iles] Flesher and R[obert] Young 
for E[phraim] D[awson], R[ichard] M[eighen], W[illiam] L[ee] and D[aniel] P[akeman], 1642), 
republished as The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England: Containing the Exposition of 
Many Ancient and Other Statutes (London: W Clarke and Sons, 1817) p 47 (emphasis added).
56 Richard Thomson, An Historical Essay on the Magna Charta of King John (London: J Major and 
R Jennings, 1829) p 227.
57 Blackstone (n 51 above) p 130, cited in Yong Vui Kong (CA) (n 10 above), p 1140 [18].
58 Lim Meng Suang (CA) (n 1 above), 44 [49] (original emphasis).
59 Constitution, Arts 4 and 162.
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common law rules. Conversely, there is no reason why the courts should 
not interpret Art 9(1) to protect a right to privacy, regardless of the 
present state of private law.
The Court then expressed what appears to be its key reason for 
interpreting Art 9(1) narrowly:60
“[W]e also observe that the right claimed by Lim and Chee, although of an 
apparently limited nature, is, in point of fact, not only vague and general, 
but also contains within itself (contradictorily) the seeds of an unlimited 
right. Put simply, such a right could be interpreted to encompass as well as 
legalise all manner of subjective expressions of love and affection, which 
could (in turn) embody content that may be wholly unacceptable from the 
perspective of broader societal policy.”
The Court emphasised that matters of social policy were outside its 
remit, and ought to be dealt with by Parliament. If judges adopted legal 
rules and interpretations of the Constitution that allowed them to 
pronounce on such matters, in the Court’s view they would be acting as 
a “mini-legislature”—a point it made eight times in the judgment—and 
thus violate the separation of powers principle.61
I will consider in due course the appropriate role of the courts in 
adjudicating cases involving social policy. For now, as I have pointed 
out above, it is submitted the Court of Appeal should have taken the 
opportunity to fully assess the meanings of these terms with reference 
to relevant decisions from other jurisdictions. The Court’s adoption of 
unduly limited understandings of “life” and “personal liberty” arguably 
goes against the presumption that the Constitution should be interpreted 
generously. In fact, by employing terms with such a high level of 
abstraction in the constitutional text without providing any definitions, 
Parliament may be seen as intending that the courts should develop the 
scope of the concepts to deal with situations it could not have foreseen. 
While a concern exists that this would tempt judges to “conjure rights … 
pursuant to their subjective political preferences”,62 it is submitted the 
disquiet may be addressed by applying a suitable legal test weighing 
various public interests to determine whether the deprivation of life or 
personal liberty, broadly understood, is “in accordance with law”. It is to 
this issue that we now turn.
60 Lim Meng Suang (CA) (n 1 above), 44–45 [49] (original emphasis).
61 Ibid., 94 [189]. For the Court’s other warnings about becoming a “mini-legislature”, see ibid., 
52 [70]; 54 [77]; 56 [82]; 57 [84]; 61 [93]; 65 [101]; and 88 [173].
62 Thio Li-ann, A Treatise on Singapore Constitutional Law (Singapore: Academy Publishing, 2012) 
p 641, para 12.008, and see generally pp 635–644, paras 12.003–12.012.
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(b) The Meaning of Save in Accordance with Law 
(i) Formal and procedural models of due process
An applicant seeking to have an executive act or a piece of legislation 
invalidated for inconsistency with Art 9(1) of the Constitution must 
not only show that the act or legislation deprives him or her of “life or 
personal liberty”, but also that the deprivation is not “in accordance with 
law”. This, in turn, depends on how the courts interpret the word “law”. 
As Victor Ramraj has pointed out, the courts of various jurisdictions 
have taken different approaches to what can generally be termed the 
due process clauses of their respective constitutions, which are broadly 
analogous to each other.63 We will focus on the approaches adopted by 
the Singapore courts, particularly in Tan Eng Hong and Lim Meng Suang.
One approach is what Ramraj terms the “formal model”, which only 
requires that life or personal liberty b e taken away by an ordinary law 
validly enacted by the legislature to be constitutional.64 Statements in 
some judgments seem to support this model’s application in Singapore. 
For instance, Ramraj cited Jabar bin Kadermastan v Public Prosecutor,65 
which raised the question of whether it is constitutional to carry out a 
sentence of capital punishment on a convicted person who has remained 
on death row for a number of years. The Court of Appeal stated: “Any law 
which provides for the deprivation of a person’s life or personal liberty, is 
valid and binding so long as it is validly passed by Parliament. The court 
is not concerned with whether it is also fair, just and reasonable as well.”66
More recently, in Lo Pui Sang the High Court took the view that 
judgments of the US Supreme Court are unhelpful in interpreting 
Art 9(1) because of differences in wording between that provision and 
the corresponding provisions of the United States Bill of Rights.67 As 
an example, the judge compared Art 9(1) with s 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment which, it may be recalled, reads in part: “… nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law”. Noting that the Singapore Constitution contains no reference to 
“due process of law”, the Court said that Art 9(1) expressly permits the 
deprivation of personal liberty if such deprivation is “in accordance with 
law”, and that phrase “must mean law passed by Parliament”.68
63 Victor V[ridar] Ramraj, “Four Models of Due Process” (2004) 2(3) Int’l J Const L 492.
64 Ibid., p 493.
65 [1995] 1 SLR(R) 326 (HC).
66 Ibid., 343 [52]; see Ramraj (n 63 above) pp 496–497.
67 Ibid.
68 Lo Pui Sang (n 15 above), 760 [6].
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The formal model provides scant protection for the rights to life and 
personal liberty. While it ensures that there is rule by law, in the sense that 
these rights cannot be abrogated unless state agents are duly empowered 
to do so by properly enacted and publicly promulgated legislation,69 such 
legislation may not satisfy conceptions of the rule of law that require 
compliance with substantive notions of fairness.70 Indeed, this model 
was rejected in 1980 in Ong Ah Chuan v Public Prosecutor71 by the 
Privy Council when it was Singapore’s final appellate court, a rejection 
recognised by the High Court in Tan Eng Hong.72 The Public Prosecutor 
had argued that since “law” is defined by Art 2(1) of the Constitution 
as including “written law … which is in operation in Singapore”, and 
the same provision states that “written law” includes “all Acts and 
Ordinances … for the time being in force in Singapore”, deprivation 
of life or liberty was constitutional if effected pursuant to an Act of 
Parliament. To the Privy Council, this argument involved “the logical 
fallacy of petitio principii”—it begged the question since unconstitutional 
statutory provisions would not in fact be “in force”.73 In its view, the 
concept of “law” refers “to a system of law which incorporates those 
fundamental rules of natural justice that had formed part and parcel 
of the common law of England that was in operation in Singapore at 
the commencement of the Constitution”.74 The apparent temporal 
limitation on the application of such rules was lifted in a judgment the 
following year, Haw Tua Tau v Public Prosecutor,75 the Privy Council 
stating that “what may properly be regarded by lawyers as rules of natural 
justice change with the times”.76
Ramraj notes that what the Privy Council had in mind was a 
“procedural model” of due process,77 one that “demands that the court 
go beyond a mere assessment of formal validity and inquire into … 
procedural fairness”.78 Indeed, in Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor 
(2010),79 a judgment delivered after Ramraj’s article was published, the 
Court of Appeal clarified that the statement in Jabar should not be taken 
69 Ramraj (n 63 above) p 497.
70 See eg, Jack Tsen-Ta Lee, “Shall the Twain Never Meet? Competing Narratives and Discourses 
of the Rule of Law in Singapore” [2012] Sing J Legal Studies 298, 305–306.
71 Ong Ah Chuan (n 41 above).
72 Tan Eng Hong (HC) (n 7 above), 1069–1070 [24]–[25] and 1072 [30].
73 Ong Ah Chuan (n 41 above), 721–722 [24]–[25].
74 Ibid., 722 [26].
75 [1981–1982] SLR(R) 133 (PC on appeal from Singapore), cited in Tan Eng Hong (HC) 
(n 7 above), 1073 [32].
76 Haw Tua Tau (n 75 above), 144 [26].
77 Ramraj (n 63 above) pp 497–498.
78 Ibid., p 497.
79 [2010] 3 SLR 489 (CA) (2010).
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as a definitive interpretation of “law” in Art 9(1), and pointed out that 
the Ong Ah Chuan stance was approved by the Co urt in Nguyen Tuong 
Van v Public Prosecutor.80 In another judgment from the Yong Vui Kong 
line of cases, Yong Vui Kong v Attorney-General (2011),81 the Court of 
Appeal reaffirmed the correctness of Ong Ah Chuan. It went on to hold 
that fundamental rules of natural justice are procedural in nature as they 
are “the same in nature and function” as administrative law rules of 
natural justice. The only difference between them is that “they operate 
at different levels of our legal order, one to invalidate legislation on the 
ground of unconstitutionality, and the other to invalidate administrative 
decisions on the ground of administrative law principles”.82
(ii) A substantive model?
Yet, there are indications that the Court has gone beyond viewing 
Art 9(1) as providing merely procedural protection, to what Ramraj calls 
the “substantive model” of due process. Under this model, “the limits 
imposed on the state are not merely procedural but are also substantive … 
[The courts] will also ask whether the deprivation of life or liberty is 
justified by the degree of moral blameworthiness of the defendant.”83 
The key decision is Yong Vui Kong (2010), though it is slightly self-
contradictory. On the one hand, the Court of Appeal seemed to reaffirm 
the procedural model. Examining Mithu v State of Punjab,84 the Court 
declined to adopt for Art 9(1) the test applied therein to Art 21 of the 
Indian Constitution85 by the Supreme Court of India, which requires legal 
procedures to be “fair, just and reasonable”, and not “fanciful, oppressive 
or arbitrary”.86 This was “too vague  a test of constitutionality”; it “hinges 
on the court’s view of the reasonableness of the law in question, and 
requires the court to intrude into the legislative sphere of Parliament as 
well as engage in policy making”.87
On the other hand, the Court was impressed by certain statements 
made by Lord Diplock during oral arguments in Ong Ah Chuan. His 
Lordship had asked whether the Public Prosecutor was contending that 
an Act of Parliament was justified by Art 9(1) “however unfair or absurd 
80 [2005] 1 SLR(R) 103, 125 [82] (CA); see Yong Vui Kong (n 79 above) 500–501 [17]–[19].
81 [2011] 2 SLR 1189 (CA).
82 Ibid., 1243 [105]. See generally ibid., 1240–1244 [99]–[107].
83 Ramraj (n 63 above) p 502.
84 AIR 1983 SC 473; (1983) 2 SCR 690 (SC, India).
85 The text of Art 21 of the Indian Constitution was set out above in the section entitled “The 
Meaning of Life and Personal Liberty”.
86 Mithu (n 84 above) (1983) 2 SCR 690, 698, citing, among other cases, Maneka Gandhi 
(n 36 above) (1978) 2 SCR 621, 658.
87 Yong Vui Kong (CA) (n 79 above), 527 [80].
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or oppressive it may be”. When counsel for the Public Prosecutor said 
it was unnecessary to rely on that argument, Lord Diplock responded 
that the court could not accept that as “they will have to deal with 
the point. They are not disposed to find that article 9(1) justifies all 
legislation whatever its nature.”88 The Court of Appeal concluded from 
this exchange that the Privy Council had accepted that some types of 
statutes do not qualify as “law” under Art 9(1). Among such statutes, 
the Court suggested colourable legislation, that is, purported statutes that 
are “in effect directed at securing the conviction of particular known 
individuals”; and “legislation of so absurd or arbitrary a nature that it 
could not possibly have been contemplated by our constitutional framers 
as being ‘law’ when they crafted the constitutional provisions protecting 
fundamental liberties”,89 for instance, a statute authorising the use of 
torture.90 The Court of Appeal thus accepted that in some cases it has a 
duty under Art 9(1) to ensure that legislation complies with due process 
in a substantive sense.
A submission along these lines was made in the Tan Eng Hong and 
Lim Meng Suang cases. In Tan Eng Hong, one of the applicant’s arguments 
was that s 377A is “absurd and entirely arbitrary” and thus “contrary to 
the fundamental rules of natural justice” since it penalises men with a 
same-sex orientation, which is “a natural and immutable attribute”.91 The 
High Court, noting that Yong Vui Kong (2010) was a binding precedent, 
agreed that “in order for a law to pass muster under the fundamental rules 
of natural justice, it must not be arbitrary or absurd”.92 However, since 
it had determined for the purpose of Art 12(1) that the legislature had 
enacted s 377A as it had “deemed the prevalence of grossly indecent 
acts between males—whether in public or in private—a regrettable state 
of affairs that was not desirable”, the provision could not be said to be 
arbitrary.93 Furthermore, the Court held the applicant had not made out 
the argument that the provision was absurd for targeting a natural and 
immutable attribute because the latter assertion had not been established 
on a balance of probabilities, such was the inconclusive nature of the 
relevant medical and scientific evidence.94
88 Ong Ah Chuan (n 41 above), [1981] AC 648, 659 (the oral arguments are not reported in the 
SLR(R) version of the judgment).
89 Yong Vui Kong (CA) (n 79 above), 500 [16].
90 Ibid., 524–525 [75].
91 Tan Eng Hong (HC) (n 7 above), 1068 [22].
92 Ibid., 1074 [37].
93 Ibid., 1076 [40].
94 Ibid., 1083 [63]–[64].
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Both the applicant and the High Court proceeded on the basis that 
Art 9(1)’s prohibition of absurd or arbitrary legislation is tied in some 
way to the concept of fundamental rules of natural justice. The argument 
might be put thus: natural justice has both procedural and substantive 
aspects to it, just as there are procedural and substantive aspects of due 
process in the United States.95 However, this point was not canvassed 
in Tan Eng Hong and it is contrary to the Court of Appeal’s view in 
Yong Vui Kong (2011) that the fundamental rules are procedural in nature. 
In Yong Vui Kong (2015) the Court regarded as a “mistake” the suggestion 
that fundamental rules of natural justice contain substantive rights, and 
rejected the appellant’s submission that a prohibition against torture could 
be given constitutional effect as an aspect of such fundamental rules.96
Indeed, when Tan Eng Hong appealed the High Court’s judgment 
to the Court of Appeal in the Lim Meng Suang case, he reiterated that 
s 377A was either absurd or arbitrary but no longer referred to fundamental 
rules of natural justice.97 The Court of Appeal essentially affirmed its 
earlier pronouncement in Yong Vui Kong (2010), but disagreed with Tan’s 
submissions. It held the applicant’s assertion that s 377A was arbitrary 
because it signalled societal disapproval of grossly indecent acts between 
males was “without any legal substantiation whatsoever”. As for the 
argument that s 377A was absurd “because it criminalised a minority 
of citizens based on a core aspect of their identity which was either 
unchangeable or suppressible only at a great personal cost”, since it closely 
resembled Lim and Chee’s argument that “personal liberty” in Art 9(1) 
includes a limited right to privacy and personal autonomy, the rejection 
of that argument meant that Tan’s argument should also be rejected. Like 
the High Court, in view of the conflicting scientific evidence, the Court 
of Appeal felt unable to reach a definitive view on the immutability of 
sexual orientation.98
Given the Court of Appeal’s recognition that Art 9(1) obliges it to 
invalidate substantially unjust laws, is the pitching of the standard at 
absurdity or arbitrariness appropriate? That standard bears more than a 
passing resemblance to the administrative law irrationality or Wednesbury 
unreasonableness standard.99 Yet, in Lim Meng Suang, the Court did 
95 For an early discussion of this possibility, see Jack Lee Tsen-Ta (n 44 above) pp 195–206.
96 Yong Vui Kong (n 10 above), 1155–1157 [61]–[64].
97 Lim Meng Suang (CA) (n 1 above), 40 [34].
98 Ibid., 45 [52]–[53].
99 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 KB 223, 229 (CA); Council 
of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374, 410 (HL). The latter case 
was cited with approval in Chng Suan Tze v Minister for Home Affairs [1988] 2 SLR(R) 525, 563 
[119] (CA).
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not regard this as an appropriate standard where a challenge to the 
constitutionality of a statute was concerned.100
I have submitted elsewhere that the Court’s application of the same 
standard to Art 12(1) of the Constitution unduly limits its ability to 
protect the right to equality, and that a proportionality analysis would 
be more apposite.101 In Lim Meng Suang, the Court of Appeal held that 
a differentiating measure prescribed by legislation will be consistent 
with Art 12(1) only if: (a) the classification is founded on an intelligible 
differentia; and (b) the differentia bears a rational relation to the object 
sought to be achieved by the law in question.102 Expounding on the 
standard to be applied to limb (b) of this rational classification test, the 
High Court indicated that the touchstone is whether the classification 
is arbitrary.103 In addition, it will be presumed that the legislation is 
constitutional,104 and it is for the applicant to adduce “compelling or 
cogent material or factual evidence”105 showing that the legislation “was 
enacted arbitrarily or had operated arbitrarily”.106
In contrast, a proportionality analysis would require the courts to 
consider whether the impugned statutory provision pursues a legitimate 
aim, whether there is a rational relation between this legitimate aim and 
the provision, and whether the provision limits rights no more than is 
necessary to accomplish the aim.107 The High Court has, however, on two 
occasions rejected a proportionality analysis when considering the rights to 
freedom of speech and assembly respectively guaranteed by Arts 14(1)(a) 
and 14(1)(b) of the Constitution. Art 14(2) provides that Parliament may 
impose on those rights restrictions as it considers “necessary or expedient” 
in the interest of various specified grounds such as national security and 
public order.108 When deciding if a certain British case should be followed 
in assessing the impact of Art 14 rights on the interpretation of particular 
100 Lim Meng Suang (CA) (n 1 above), 57 [86].
101 Jack Tsen-Ta Lee (n 9 above) pp 184–185.
102 Lim Meng Suang (CA) (n 1 above), 48 [60].
103 Lim Meng Suang (HC) (n 6 above), 166–167 [113]; see Jack Tsen-Ta Lee (n 9 above) 
pp 170–173.
104 Lim Meng Suang (CA) (n 1 above), 31 [4].
105 Lim Meng Suang (HC) (n 6 above) 162 [101].
106 Ibid., 164 [105], citing Public Prosecutor v Taw Cheng Kong [1988] 2 SLR(R) 489, 514 [80] (CA); 
see Jack Tsen-Ta Lee (n 9 above) pp 179–183.
107 Compare Secretary for Justice v Yau Yuk Lung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 335, 349 [20] (CFA, Hong 
Kong), discussed in Jack Tsen-Ta Lee (n 9 above) pp 177–179.
108 Based on how Art 14(2)(a) of the Constitution is worded, it would appear that the legislature 
may restrict the right to free speech on some grounds without the limitations being “necessary 
or expedient”—the relevant parts of the Article state: “Parliament may by law impose … 
restrictions designed to protect the privileges of Parliament or to provide against contempt of 
court, defamation or incitement to any offence.”
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statutory provisions, in Chee Siok Chin v Minister for Home Affairs109 the 
Court said that proportionality was:110
“… very much a continental European jurisprudential concept imported 
into English law by virtue of the UK’s treaty obligations. … Needless to 
say, the notion of proportionality has never been part of the common law 
in relation to the judicial review of the exercise of a legislative and/or 
an administrative power or discretion. Nor has it ever been part of 
Singapore law.” 
Subsequently, in Chee Soon Juan v Public Prosecutor,111 the High Court 
was invited to consider the Canadian case Vancouver (City) v Zhang112 
when determining whether the requirement imposed by the Public 
Entertainments and Meetings Act113 to obtain a licence before making 
a public address infringed the appellants’ freedom of expression. Noting 
that s  1 of the Canadian Charter permits onl y legislative restrictions 
that minimally impair rights and freedoms,114 the Court implicitly 
concluded that a proportionality approach could not be taken in Singapore 
as “[u]nlike the position in Canada, there is no requirement in Singapore 
for such restrictions to meet the minimal impairment requirement”.115
Nonetheless, it is arguable that the High Court’s comments in 
Chee Siok Chin were obiter,116 and in any case the Court of Appeal has 
yet to rule authoritatively on the relevance of a proportionality analysis 
in constitutional adjudication. As proportionality has become widely 
accepted as the predominant standard for the protection of human 
rights,117 I venture that it should also be adopted as the legal test for 
determining the proper balance to be struck between the rights to life and 
liberty guaranteed by Art 9(1) and other public interests pursued by the 
Parliament in enacting laws impinging on these rights. It does not seem 
likely, though, that the courts will take up a proportionality approach 
towards either liberty or equality rights unless they fundamentally reassess 
their role in judicial review.
109 [2006] 1 SLR(R) 582 (HC).
110 Ibid., 616 [87].
111 [2011] 2 SLR 940 (HC).
112 [2010] BCCA 450 (CA, BC, Canada).
113 Cap 257, 2011 Rev Ed.
114 Chee Soon Juan (n 111 above), 946 [9], citing R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103 (SC, Canada). 
Section 1 of the Charter states: “The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the 
rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can 
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”
115 Chee Soon Juan (n 111 above), 946–947 [9].
116 Jack Tsen-Ta Lee, “According to the Spirit and not to the Letter: Proportionality and the 
Singapore Constitution” (2014) 8(3) Vienna J Int’l Const L 276, 285.
117 Alec Stone Sweet and Jud Mathews, “Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism” 
(2008) 47 Colum J Transnat’l L 72, 72–73. See generally Jack Tsen-Ta Lee, ibid.
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3. The Courts’ Role in Constitutional Review
The adoption by the Singapore courts of a proportionality analysis would 
require them to delve into why the framers of the Constitution chose 
to regard a particular right set out therein as fundamental, as well as 
to consider whether Parliament has provided sufficiently convincing 
reasons why the right should be restricted. The latter exercise would also 
require the courts to examine applicants’ counterarguments as to why the 
restrictive legislation fails to achieve its objects, or has a disproportionate 
impact on rights.
In Lim Meng Suang, the Court of Appeal indicated that it would not 
subject laws to such a level of scrutiny. Holding that s 377A of the Penal 
Code is not so absurd as to fail to constitute a “law” under Art 9(1) of the 
Constitution because it criminalises people based on an aspect of their 
identity that is arguably unchangeable, the Court said the immutability 
or otherwise of sexual orientation was “precisely one of the extra-legal 
arguments that is not within the remit of this court”.118 Subsequently, when 
considering if s 377A infringed Art 12(1) of the Constitution, the Court 
had to assess whether a rational relation exists between the characteristics 
used to define the class of persons impacted by the section and the object 
of the section. Again, whether sexual orientation is an immutable trait119 
was one of a number of “extra-legal arguments” raised by the appellants 
which the Court felt were “not arguments that may be appropriately 
considered by the court and are thus legally irrelevant. Put simply, the 
court is not the appropriate forum in which to canvass such arguments; 
the appropriate forum in this regard is, instead, the Legislature.”120 These 
arguments also included the safeguarding of health,121 and whether it was 
constitutionally permissible for Parliament to declare illegal same-sex 
conduct between men on the basis that it was regarded by a majority in 
society as immoral without establishing that it caused harm.122 As regards 
the latter, the Court noted it was open to the appellants to show that “the 
prevailing societal morality is wrong as it deprives them of their freedom”. 
However, they would “need to bring to bear a great number of extra-legal 
arguments, which … are uniquely within the purview of the Legislature”. 
These might include, for example, empirical data in the form of surveys 
“which this court is not equipped to assess”.123
118 Lim Meng Suang (CA) (n 1 above), 45 [53] (original emphasis).
119 Ibid., 89 [176].
120 Ibid., 83 [156] (original emphasis).
121 Ibid., 89 [177].
122 Ibid., 84–88 [162]–[174].
123 Ibid., 88 [173] (original emphasis).
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In Yong Vui Kong (2015), the appellant argued that statutes prescribing 
caning as a punishment are so irrational or arbitrary that they do 
not constitute “law” because there was no evidence that the penalty 
acted as either a specific or general deterrent. Predictably, the Court 
evinced reluctance to undertake a full examination of the argument, 
merely stating that it was “plainly without merit” because “it is not 
the role of the courts to pass judgment on whether a particular type of 
sentence prescribed by Parliament is justified as a matter of deterrence 
or otherwise”.124
One way courts could try and avoid substantively scrutinising 
legislation would be to adhere to a strictly procedural model of due 
process. However, it has been said that the conceptual distinction 
between procedure and substance is anything but clear. In the Supreme 
Court of Canada judgment Re BC Motor Act,125 the provision of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms at issue was s 7, which states: 
“Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the 
right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles 
of fundamental justice.” Justice Bertha Wilson expressed “grave doubts 
that the dichotomy between substance and procedure which may have 
served a purpose in other areas of the law … should be imported into 
s 7 of the Charter. In many instances the line between substance and 
procedure is a very narrow one.”126 For example, she noted that while a 
rebuttable presumption of fact can be regarded as procedural in nature 
because it allocates the burden of proof, it is also substantive as it 
protects an accused person’s right to be treated as innocent until proved 
otherwise.127
The House of Lords has also ruled in a different context that a 
distinction between procedure and substance cannot sensibly be 
maintained. In Boddington v British Transport Police,128 the question 
posed was whether a byelaw’s validity can be raised as a defence in 
criminal proceedings brought for infringement of the byelaw. Previous 
case law had held the answer to be “yes” if the byelaw was on invalid 
on its face or patently unreasonable (“substantive invalidity”), but “no” 
if the byelaw was created through a defective procedure (“procedur al 
invalidity”).129 The Lord Chancellor, Lord Irvine of Lairg, said the 
distinction was contrary to Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation 
124 Yong Vui Kong (n 10 above), 1171–1172 [100]–[101].
125 [1985] 2 SCR 486 (SC, Canada).
126 Ibid., 531. See also ibid., 498–499 (Lamer J).
127 Ibid., 531–532.
128 [1999] 2 AC 143 (HL).
129 Bugg v Director of Public Prosecutions [1993] QB 473 (Div Ct). See Boddington, ibid., 157.
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Commission,130 which had established that “there was just a single 
category of errors of law, all of which rendered a decision ultra vires. 
No distinction is to be drawn between a patent (or substantive) error of 
law or a latent (or procedural) error of law.”131 Besides, “the distinction 
between orders which are ‘substantively’ invalid and orders which are 
‘procedurally’ invalid is not a practical distinction which is capable 
of being maintained in a principled way across the broad range of 
administrative action.”132
Furthermore, even if it were possible to differentiate clearly between 
procedure and substance, Ramraj has pointed out that there is no 
normative basis for such a distinction. He asks: “Why should the law be 
more concerned with fair legal procedures than with moral culpability?” 
Indeed, by developing common law principles of criminal liability such 
as the mens rea doctrine, courts have essentially asserted that it is within 
their power and expertise to decide substantive “questions of moral 
innocence”.133
In any case, the procedural model bird has flown the coop. The 
Singapore Court of Appeal has unambiguously accepted that it does have 
a responsibility under Art 9(1) to declare substantially unjust laws void. 
Yet, if it is inappropriate for the courts to examine so-called “extra-legal 
arguments”, how are they to ascertain whether laws are in fact absurd 
or arbitrary? Moreover, if the procedure–substance distinction is illusory, 
attempts to draw a bright line between rights-limiting laws that are absurd 
or arbitrary, and those which simply fail to achieve legitimate aims or do 
so in a manner that disproportionately impacts on rights, suffer from the 
same objection. To apply Art 9(1) in  a principled manner, the courts 
should determine whether laws have deprived people of life or personal 
liberty in a disproportionate manner, avoiding the artificial strictures of 
merely testing for procedural failures on the one hand, and substantive 
absurdity or arbitrariness on the other.
This would require the courts to reconceptualise their role, to see it 
as their duty in judicial review cases to ensure that the political branches 
of government have struck an appropriate balance between protecting 
fundamental liberties and pursuing other public interests. This ought not 
to be seen as an incursion into the executive and legislative domains, but 
as fulfilling the check and balance contemplated by the existence of a bill 
130 [1969] 2 AC 147 (HL).
131 Boddington (n 128 above), 158.
132 Ibid., 159. See also ibid., 170–171 (Lord Steyn).
133 Ramraj (n 63 above) p 508.
HKLJ-46(1)-04.The Limits of Liberty.indd   69 29/04/16   4:32 pm
70 Jack Tsen-Ta Lee (2016) HKLJ
of rights in the Constitution and the separation of powers doctrine. As 
Eric Barendt has explained:134
“[T]he separation of powers should not be explained in terms of a strict 
distribution of functions between the three branches of government, but 
in terms of a network of rules and principles which ensure that power is not 
concentrated in the hands of one branch.”
As it cannot be assumed that the political branches are perfect, judicial 
review exists as a mechanism for errors to be corrected. The courts 
provide an independent, expert perspective on whether constitutional 
principles have been complied with. In turn, the political branches act 
as a check on the judiciary: if they feel strongly that a constitutional 
ruling is undesirable, they can seek to reverse it by way of a constitutional 
amendment.
To summarise, in Lim Meng Suang the Court of Appeal found that 
s 377A did not violate Art 9(1) of the Constitution, first by giving the 
concepts of “life” and “personal liberty” a narrow interpretation that 
excluded the protection of personal autonomy and privacy. It then 
affirmed that, in considering whether a statutory provision had deprived 
an individual of life or personal liberty “in accordance with law”, a 
substantively unjust provision could not properly be described as a “law” 
and would thus be inconsistent with Art 9(1). However, the Court adopted 
a high standard of absurdity or arbitrariness, and declined to consider 
what it termed “extra-legal arguments” proffered by the appellants to 
explain why s 377A was oppressive and unfair to them. The Court thus 
showed that it sees itself as responsible for dealing with the most egregious 
breaches of the Constitution—perhaps quite unlikely to take place these 
days—but preferring to defer to the political branches on matters seen as 
socially controversial. I submit, though, that “life” and “personal liberty” 
should be interpreted generously as befits their status as constitutional 
concepts, and that the Court should adopt a proportionality analysis 
to determine whether Parliament has legitimately restricted the rights 
guaranteed by Art 9(1). The time is ripe for the Court to discover afresh 
its role as a coequal branch of the government.
134 Eric Barendt, “Separation of Powers and Constitutional Government” [1995] Pub L 599, 608–609.
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